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Abstract 
Kenosis and the nature of the Persons in the Trinity 
Philippians 2:7 describes the kenosis of Christ, that is Christ’s free 
choice to limit himself for the sake of human salvation. Although the 
idea of Christ’s kenosis as an explanation of the incarnation has 
generated considerable controversy and has largely been rejected in 
its original form, it is clear that in this process Christ did humble 
himself. This view is consistent with some contemporary perspectives 
on God’s self-limitation; in particular as this view provides a 
justification for human freedom of choice. As kenosis implies a freely 
chosen action of God, and not an inherent and temporary limitation, 
kenosis is consistent with an affirmation of God’s sovereignty. This 
view is particularly true if Christ’s kenosis is seen as a limitation of 
action and not of his attributes. Such an idea does not present 
problems concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, specifically regarding 
the relation between the economic and the immanent nature of the 
Trinity. The Trinitarian doctrine, on the contrary, indeed complements 
this idea – specifically the concept of perichoresis (the inter-
relatedness among the Persons of the Triniy and the relation between 
the two natures of Christ). 
Opsomming 
Kenosis  en die aard van die Persone in die Drie-eenheid 
Filippense 2:7 beskryf die kenosis van Christus – sy vrye keuse om 
homself te ontledig ter wille van die mens se verlossing. Alhoewel die 
gedagte van Christus se kenosis as ŉ verklaring vir die vleeswording 
van Christus skerp meningsverskille veroorsaak het en tot ŉ groot 
mate in sy oorspronklike vorm verwerp is, is dit duidelik dat Christus 
homself deur sy selfontlediging (kenosis) verneder het. Hierdie siening 
is in ooreenstemming met sekere hedendaagse perspektiewe op God 
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se selfbeperking – in die besonder omdat dié siening ’n regverdiging 
bied vir die mens se vryheid om ’n keuse te maak. Omdat kenosis ŉ 
handeling impliseer wat God vrywillig gekies het, en dus nie ’n 
inherente en tydelike beperking is nie, is kenosis tegelyk ŉ bevestiging 
van God se soewereiniteit. Die waarheid van hierdie siening kom 
spesifiek na vore as Christus se kenosis nie beskou word as ’n 
beperking van Christus se dade en sy eienskappe nie. Hierdie 
opvatting skep nie probleme ten opsigte van die leerstuk van die Drie-
eenheid nie, veral probleme aangaande die verhouding tussen die 
ekonomie van die Drie-eenheid en die immanente aard van die Drie-
eenheid. Die leerstuk van die Drie-eenheid is inderdaad ’n aanvulling 
van genoemde idee – veral dan die konsep van perekoresis (die 
onderlinge verbondenheid van die drie Persone in die Drie-eenheid en 
die verhouding tussen die twee nature van Christus). 
1. Introduction 
The so-called “hymn to Christ”, Carmen Christi (Martin, 1983), in 
Philippians 2:5-11, contains within it the statement of Jesus’ self-
emptying, or kenosis. The concept of kenosis is certainly striking, 
especially in the context of the affirmation of the full deity of the 
second Person of the Trinity, and as such has attracted a vast 
amount of scholarly attention as to its meaning. It would seem to be 
obvious from the preceding verse that kenosis implies that Jesus 
divested himself of the full attributes of deity; he in fact “emptied” 
himself of his Godly attributes. Christ thus was no longer equal to 
God, in order to become fully human and ultimately die on the cross. 
This act has been seen as part of the process of atonement, by 
which human salvation was achieved. 
Alternative explanations to this view have, however, been 
suggested. The influential scholar, James Dunn, for example in 
keeping with his advocacy of an “Adam Christology”, has rejected 
such a metaphysical interpretation in favour of viewing the kenosis 
as explained by the next phrase in the hymn. According to this 
explanation Jesus accepted the powerlessness of a slave (Dunn, 
1989:116). Martin (1983:170) also supports this view, believing that 
the emptying must be interpreted metaphorically. Such an approach 
would be consistent with 2 Corinthians 8:9, which is often cited to 
support the idea of kenosis. It may be commented that this 
“powerlessness” is indeed part of Christ’s kenosis and in fact, that 
crucifixion was a punishment reserved for slaves and for 
insurrectionists, even if the accusation of the latter was the official 
justification for Jesus’ execution. If, however, a more traditional 
Christology is accepted, especially in keeping with Chalcedon, such 
an idea can be a part of the whole picture. In this regard John 17:5, 
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also a “kenotic” verse, implies a glory in his pre-existence. Dunn 
(1989:31), however, simply rejects this testimony to Jesus’ self-
consciousness. 
Traditional theology also includes affirmation of the Trinity, a 
doctrine which has also been subject to considerable questioning 
and reinterpretation. Although it is not always done, any discussion 
of Christology should take cognisance of its implications for the 
Trinity. Indeed, Philippians 2 has distinct Trinitarian implications. The 
fear of any hint of Arian subordination has also influenced many 
against a view of kenosis. However, recent suggestions, such as put 
forward by Moltmann, have indicated that a form of kenosis is 
actually characteristic of the divine nature as such. In this case 
kenosis would be a feature of all three of the Persons. Regarding 
the latter view Moltmann is concerned to relate his view of God to 
the current situation in the world, especially to that of human 
suffering. He writes from the framework of being a German who 
participated in the second World War. Certainly a suggestion of 
God’s self-limitation can provide an explanation for suffering, and if 
for no other reason, can justify a re-examination of the concept of 
kenosis, especially against the background of the Trinity. Even more 
recently, the “open theism” movement (cf. Pinnock, 2001) has 
stressed human free will, but their belief in God’s limitation has 
incurred the wrath of many Calvinists. 
2. Kenosis 
The “kenotic theory” was popular in Germany between about 1860 
and 1880, and then in England from about 1890 to 1910 (Grudem, 
1994:550). The originator of the idea on the continent was the 
Lutheran, Thomasius, who taught that the Son had abandoned the 
metaphysical attributes of deity (McGrath, 1997:355). Gess went 
further, including other aspects of divinity and also the idea of 
generation and the exercise of Christ’s cosmic functions, such as 
upholding the universe (Macleod, 1998:206). 
Essentially, what was suggested was that in order to become 
incarnate, the second Person of the Trinity “emptied” himself of the 
attributes that are characteristic of being God – attributes such as 
omnipotence and omniscience, so that his exercise of power and 
knowledge were equal to those of an ordinary human being. The 
kenotic theory was at least an attempt to probe a little into the 
mystery of the incarnation and not just to ignore it. In fact, it is often 
felt that the statement of Chalcedon is not so much an explanation 
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of the incarnation, but a statement of its parameters – even of the 
problem. 
This view of kenosis was immediately attractive to the 
Enlightenment world-view, for it implied that Jesus could share the 
understanding of the Bible of the “unenlightened” world of his time. 
He would therefore accept the narratives of creation and of Jonah as 
being historically determined, and ascribe the authorship of the 
Pentateuch to Moses and the Psalms to David, all of which 
traditional beliefs were increasingly questioned at that time. This 
approach also reflects the Biblical assertions of Jesus’ ignorance 
(e.g. Matt. 24:36; Mark 9:21) and growth (Luk. 2:52). On the other 
hand, the Gospels do indicate that Jesus did know and claimed that 
he was indeed the Son, and that the disciples also recognised his 
divinity. He also is recorded as having performed significant 
miracles. These miracles could, however, well be attributed, not to 
the divinity of the Son, but to the action of the Spirit, who 
empowered Christ at his baptism, then inspired him and his 
disciples. The ministry of the Holy Spirit was largely neglected at the 
time when the kenotic theory developed, but if the role of the Holy 
Spirit had not been neglected, the idea of the self-limitation of Jesus 
may perhaps have met with fewer objections. 
In England, the idea was espoused by Gore, who saw it as a way of 
reconciling Anglo-Catholics and liberals (Macleod, 1998:206). As in 
the early Church, it was hard to separate theological discussion from 
more worldly concerns. Gore sometimes spoke in terms of 
“refraining”, sometimes of “abandoning” when trying to define 
kenosis. It is notable that Gore accepted the definitions of Nicaea 
and of Chalcedon without reservation (Macleod, 1998:206).  
The idea of kenosis was attacked for a number of reasons. Creed 
cites the admission of Thomasius himself, that is, that there is little 
support for the notion of kenosis in the views of the Fathers. 
Furthermore Creed indicates that the closest form of support was a 
comment in Apollinarius that “incarnation is self-emptying” (Baillie, 
1956:94). Grudem (1994:550) believes that no recognised teacher 
taught the idea for 1 800 years, including native Greek speakers. 
Apollinarius was of course condemned as a heretic for his 
Christological views. This fact in itself is not too serious: all theology 
must be seen in its own context. In fact, many of the Fathers would 
have been condemned by later standards. Thinkers such as 
Apollinarius were trying to understand and had no intention of being 
heretical or of denying what had previously been accepted. On the 
contrary, Erickson (1991:78) asserts that the idea of kenosis has 
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featured in Christologies from the earliest days. Augustine can of 
course be relied upon to make at least some comments relevant to 
the issue. According to Augustine “Jesus emptied himself not by 
changing his own divinity but by assuming our changeableness” 
(Macleod, 1998:216). A more modern belief is that of Calvin, who 
said that whereas Jesus could not divest himself of his Godhead, he 
concealed it for a time (Macleod, 1998:218). Relating to humanity 
renders kenosis essential. Calvin even speaks of God’s “baby-talk” in 
order to communicate with us (Horton, 2002:324). 
A common point of criticism was made by Archbishop William 
Temple, who voiced an objection based on Hebrews 1:3. He could 
not see that a kenotic Christ could fulfil his function of upholding the 
universe (Macleod, 1998:209). It may be commented that pro-
vidence does not in fact need the constant and direct involvement of 
Christ, but as long as the possibility of God’s intervention in the 
process is affirmed, this view need not then imply Deism (cf. 
Sanders, 1998:10). Many open theists, while respecting free choice, 
and thus seeing a limitation of God’s control, speak of God 
intervening if his overall intention is threatened (Nicholls, 2002:629 
ff.) – the same can be true of a kenotic God. 
The theory did go out of favour and the word kenosis gained a 
measure of notoriety. More recent thought has expressed some 
sympathy with the idea of kenosis; thus allowing the world to affect 
God (Pinnock, 2001:12). This interpretation is also attractive, 
especially as it is in keeping with the preferred approach to 
Christology “from below”, to start from the evidence of Jesus’ 
humanity and to seek to understand him from that context. It is 
suggested that the traditional view of God’s attributes is actually 
foreign to Christianity, but is imported from Greek philosophy 
(Horton, 2002:317). It must be observed that a similar accusation is 
often made about the doctrine of the Trinity. This view is in contrast 
to early kenoticism, which was really “from above”, and tried to 
relate it to an assumed immutability – an approach that certainly 
contributed to its downfall.  
A recent approach rather attempts to understand God from the 
experience of Christ’s kenosis (Richard, 1997:84). Moltmann is 
particularly noteworthy in this respect. As in other areas, he 
expresses an appreciation for the insights of Eastern Orthodoxy. 
Russians, such as Bulgakov in The wisdom of God, have used this 
idea in respect of creation and the Trinity, not only within the context 
of Christology (Baillie, 1956:98). Moltmann (1981:219) thus has 
described the act of creation as a limitation in God, in so far as it 
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was the result of a choice to create an entity which has an existence 
distinct from God, and therefore to an extent is independent of him. 
God then suffers with, and therefore for his creation – hardly the 
traditional impassibility. In this case, God is “open”, because he is 
affected by what happens in the world. Bonhoeffer (e.g. 1967:196) 
also has similar views, which should also be evaluated within the 
framework of his historical context – the Germany of the Second 
World War. 
A major objection to the earlier concept of kenosis rests on the belief 
that kenosis implies a change in the nature of the second Person –  
at least for a while. This interpretation seems to be in conflict with 
the traditional teaching of immutability. If this change in the nature of 
Christ is, however, seen not so much as an aspect of a divine 
attribute, but as consistency or faithfulness (e.g. König, 1982:89), 
this problem is resolved. Such an approach also explains such 
problems as God’s repentance as in the story of Jonah (also 
Pinnock, 2001:85 ff.). Mackintosh accepts kenosis, as the only 
immutability is that of love (Macleod, 1998:218). Later development 
avoided this problem by arguing that God’s attributes were not 
abandoned, but rather either “hidden” or that Jesus abstained from 
using them. The former viewpoint is often called the theory of 
krypsis (Greek “hidden”), and was advocated by the University of 
Tübingen. The latter is referred to as kenosis by Griessen. Such an 
interpretation of kenosis, seeing it not so much as divestment, but as 
self-limitation, avoids much of the criticism of the original idea. 
The British scholar, Forsyth, was also associated with the idea of 
kenosis. He pointed out some of the problems with the traditional 
view, such that it is hard to see how there could in fact be two wills 
in Christ, if one was divinely omniscient, while the other was human 
and fallible (Macleod, 1998:208). Significantly he saw the aspects of 
omnipotence not so much as attributes, but rather as functions of 
deity. Martin (1983:171) indeed comments that any metaphysical 
“laying off” of attributes is foreign to Paul, or, he suggests, to reality. 
The respected New Testament scholar, Lightfoot, observed that the 
schema of Philippians 2 was outward and accidental (Macleod, 
1998:216). The use of morphe (“form”) in Philippians was not based 
on Greek philosophy, but on the Septuagint: it implies outward 
appearance and change, the accessibility of what is there. A further 
significant observation that Macleod made was that the humility that 
Jesus expressed in the incident where he washed the feet of his 
disciples was in the immediate context of his coming from the Father 
(John 13:2 ff.). “It is his very form to forgo his rights” – so He felt that 
it was inherent to the very nature of God to humble himself. This 
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point becomes clearer with the realisation that the kenosis 
mentioned in Philippians should be regarded as in relation – not to 
Christ’s humanity in relation to deity – but to the lordship which 
Christ refused to use (Martin, 1983:175), until later, after the cross 
and resurrection, when it was clearly granted. Thus kenosis points to 
a self-limitation, a rejection of the use of power and authority that is 
still available. 
3. Self-limitation 
There is a natural inclination to view limitation as inherently bad and 
thus inappropriate to God. Part of the reason for this inclination is that 
many of the limitations that are experienced by human beings are not 
inherent, but on the contrary, have been received by choice, by sin 
and are thus indeed bad. Boyd (2001:251) suggests that Jesus’ power 
was that which people would have had should they have been 
unfallen. The connection of human limitation with sin is certainly 
implied in the Genesis account of the fall. Quite apart from the 
Genesis account, the limitation of humanity follows as an inevitable 
consequence of the nature of sin itself. This alleged consequence 
may be understood as a breakdown in relationship. Boyd (2001:346) 
suggests the sin lies in self-centredness – thus closedness. As a 
result of sin humanity lost the ability to live forever, as humanity also 
lost access to the tree of life. They lost eternal life. Because of the 
breakdown of the link with God, divine life is not enjoyed and death is 
inevitable. Death will in any case result as bodily inter-relationships 
deteriorate. Then people certainly lost their power to affect the 
environment, because of the curse that was laid upon it (Gen. 3:17). 
As the power that humanity has over its environment is largely 
enabled by cooperation among people, any breakdown in this 
cooperation results in a diminishing of that power. Adam and Eve also 
lost an aspect of the freedom of movement in their exclusion from the 
garden. Perhaps it is even the case that although the first sin is 
described as due to eating from the tree of knowledge, this act is 
specifically referred to as connected to “good and evil” (Gen. 2:9). 
Certainly Adam and Eve’s knowledge was also affected. As human 
knowledge is also dependent on interaction both with other people 
and on the internal brain processes, knowledge is also affected. 
However, even if sin and thus the limitation due to it is wrong, the 
power of choice that enabled sin is not. In fact, the ability to choose 
is part of the human role as in imago Dei – being able to choose, 
because God himself has chosen. Such choice can be to self-limit. 
Philippians 2:5 ff. indicates the free choice of the second Person in 
this regard. Christ chose, but choice does not have to result in sin; the 
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New Testament witness is indeed of Christ’s sinlessness. Likewise, 
whereas the choice to sin restricts relationships, Christ’s choice to 
self-limit was in order to enhance relationships. Incidentally it is the 
absence of sin in the Trinity that enables the possibility of the full inter-
relationship of perichoresis between the Persons and between the two 
natures of Christ. 
It must be stressed that the kenosis of the second Person need not 
be thought of as affecting his fundamental nature. Although Baillie 
(1956:97), in his study of Christology, feels that the suggestion of 
kenosis came from a presupposition that unlimited divinity and 
humanity cannot be united, the Fathers constantly applied 
Philippians 2 to the incarnation, seeing no change in the eternal 
logos (Richard, 1997:75). Emphatically kenosis does not imply 
something imposed from outside, which would indeed be contrary to 
the sovereignty of God. Kenosis is a voluntary self-limitation and 
does not imply any change in the essential nature of God. Richard 
(1997:38) stresses that redemption occurred because Jesus positively 
accepted death; it was by his choice of love, not by something forced 
on him. As omnipotent, Christ is freely able to limit his own 
omnipotence and his omniscience. To say that God cannot limit 
himself, is itself a limitation (Erickson, 1991:81). In this regard, an 
useful distinction has been suggested between omnipotence, i.e. 
being able to do anything, and almightiness, i.e. being able to do all 
that is wanted (Van den Brink, 1993:215). Pinnock (2001:96) 
therefore criticises Wright for believing that God’s sovereignty 
demands that he actually controls everything. 
Macleod (1998:219) states that “it is perfectly possible to speak of 
real renunciation without defining it as renunciation of deity”. By 
accepting this stance no conflict with pre-existence exists, as 
Temple feared (Macleod, 1998:210). In an article Smith endorses 
kenosis as orthodox (Grudem, [1994:550], however finds this 
assessment surprising). Similarly, the open theists commonly assert 
that far from compromising God’s power, their stand rather 
enhances it (Boyd, 2001:147). A fixed and therefore known future 
effectively also limits God. On the contrary, self-limitation enables a 
real gain for God, enabling relationships with free agents that would 
otherwise not have been possible (Pinnock, 2002:216). Again, an 
open future means that God is open to being affected by it, while 
opening to relationships involves being affected by them. God is so 
great that he is able to cope with the uncertainty generated by the 
freedom of others. The point is also made that God would have 
been limited if he could not have created free agents. Although there 
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are things that God cannot do, such as sin or die, these are in fact 
negations of limitation (Highfield, 2002:286). 
4. Immanent and economic Trinity 
Any discussion of Christology naturally relates to the doctrine of the 
Trinity. The objections to kenosis can largely be met through the 
doctrine of the Trinity. The argument defending immutability is 
weakened in the fact that the second Person did become incarnate. 
König (1982:86) insists that as the Word became flesh this 
involvement changed. The upholding of the universe could also be 
maintained by the other Persons, especially as all three are involved 
in all actions of God. 
Even if it may be stated that if the kenosis of the second Person is 
not a change in his essence, and does not imply an inherent 
limitation, the fact, however, remains that the second Person, in his 
incarnation, was not manifesting the attributes of divinity. Jesus 
could indeed affirm that “the Father is greater than I” (John 14:28), 
for that was the case. Even though, at that time, the second Person 
was actually less than the first Person, it would, however, be wrong 
to understand this as inherent subordination – the view supported by 
Arius. During the period of the earthly incarnation and even until the 
consummation of all things, when God is “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28), 
the second Person limited himself for the sake of humanity. This 
does imply that the nature of the Trinity manifested to the world, is 
not the same as it is in itself. 
Thus the concept of kenosis can be understood to imply a difference 
between the so-called immanent Trinity – God in himself, in which 
there is total equality – and the economic Trinity – God as 
manifested to the world, where kenosis and thus subordination exist. 
This idea had been proposed by Joachim of Fiore, but it was 
condemned by the Fourth Lateran Council (Gresham, 1993:331). 
Certainly many people would dispute this distinction and insist that 
the revelation of God in the world is a reflection of what he really is, so 
that there is no real distinction between the economic Trinity and the 
immanent Trinity. Rahner (1970:22) in particular is well known for his 
insistence that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. His view 
would certainly seem to be more in keeping with the character of God. 
It seems more logical to see the revelation of God as reflecting what 
he really is.  
This distinction has often been made in recent times. This contrasts 
the “processions” of the second and third Persons in the inner being of 
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God and the “missions” of Son and Spirit to the world (cf. Thompson, 
1994:27, 35). Indeed it has been suggested, as in the “social Trinity”, 
that the idea of the “processions” pertains only to the economic 
relations and that the immanent relations are simply eternal states 
(Hodgson, 1943:102). Richard (1997:108), interestingly, sees the 
processions as aspects of kenosis. Pannenberg notes that texts 
referring to Jesus’ sonship, although they need not rule out the idea of 
eternal generation, do not demand it (cited in Erickson, 1991:305). 
The kenosis of the second Person actually demands that he be 
generated, at least in that period. However, this does not pertain to 
the immanence, where his full divinity really excludes it, because while 
equal to the first Person, he is in himself autotheos. Whether this is 
indeed so, it is clear that relationships in the immanence and economy 
need not be the same, as is the case in life, where a person may 
present a picture to the world which greatly differs from that of the real 
self. 
A distinction between immanent and economic Trinities may in fact 
even be demanded by the nature of God. LaCugna (1993:219) 
remarks that God's self-communication in himself must be different 
from his communication to the world. Molnar (1989:398) comments, 
particularly referring to Barth, that a theology based on revelation 
must separate the two Trinities. For example, the incarnate Son came 
from the Spirit, while the traditional understanding is that the second 
Person was generated from the Father (LaCugna, 1993:220). 
Thompson (1994:27) points out that if the economic and immanent 
Trinities were the same, God would have been forced to act in a 
particular way, that would deny God;s freedom (Molnar, 1989:367). 
This point is particularly significant in the current debate concerning 
“open theism”. Congar (1983:13) points out that although the 
economic Trinity is immanent, this is not reversible, as Rahner 
alleges. There is more to the immanent Trinity than that which has 
been revealed to us. As Athanasius observed, the three Persons must 
be distinguished, but also be related (Torrance, 1996:7). Gollwitzer is 
effectively saying the same thing by insisting that God;s “being for us” 
should not overshadow his “being in himself” (Bracken, 1979:53). The 
eastern Orthodox, since Palamas (1296-1359), distinguish the incom-
municable “essence” of God from his expression in his “energies”, 
which are what we experience. Incidentally this distinction implies that 
the eastern Orthodox can say that the essence of the Spirit is from the 
Father alone, while his energies are through the Son (Gaybba, 
1987:55). Even Rahner in fact distinguishes between the immanent 
and economic Trinity; it is not consistent to refer to “modes” within the 
immanent Trinity, but to respect real personal distinction in the 
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economic (Bracken, in Hill, 1982:219). There must be a distinction in 
both the immanent and the economic, but there need not be the same 
distinction, even if they are related. It is quite possible to understand 
that God’s inner being is far more complex than has been revealed to 
us and indeed it ought to be. What is necessary is that the economic 
Trinity must be consistent with the immanent, even if it is only a part of 
it. Any person is a mystery to others – and God even more. The Trinity 
as we understand it, can be a single facet of the richness of God’s full 
being: “... the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, but not the 
whole of the immanent Trinity” (Boff, 1988:215). This view of the 
Trinity need not imply a loss of perfection as Greek theology 
assumed, thereby putting God firmly outside time (Peters, 1993:129). 
Of course, the Persons of the Trinity must not be excessively 
separated. Peters (1993:8, 39) points out that God in immanence 
must be affected by the world, a belief particularly associated with 
Moltmann’s thought. This approach especially pertains to the cross 
episode (Olson, 1989:218). Many scholars, such as Moltmann and 
Jenson (Peters, 1993:24, 133), suggest that the economic Trinity not 
only reveals the immanent, but becomes it at the end of time, when 
“Rahner’s rule” becomes really true (Peters, 1993:16, 177). At this 
point, as salvation is fully completed, kenosis comes to an end. 
5. Perichoresis 
Far from the idea of kenosis being incompatible with the Trinity, the 
concepts may rather be seen as clarifying one another. This view 
follows from the suggestion of perichoresis as part of the commonly 
accepted formula of the Trinity. This angle of interpretation was 
brought in to explain that which was otherwise a fundamental difficulty 
in understanding the Trinity. How could the three Persons be totally 
equal, yet distinct; for once they are distinct, they can surely not be 
equal? Perichoresis or in its closest English equivalent, “inter-
penetration”, represents the idea that the Persons are mutually 
involved in one another to such a degree that they are equal. They are 
fully open to one another (Torrance, 1996:153). The classic 
manifestation of the working out of this principle was the Augustinian 
affirmation, opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt (“the external works 
of the Trinity are undivided”). This principle implies that every action of 
God, even if it is through one of the Persons, has the total involvement 
of the other two Persons. This perspective was not just put forward as 
a neat theological idea, but, like the idea of kenosis, was believed to 
be based on the Scriptures (in this case especially John 14:11). The 
Fathers were always concerned to develop their theology in 
accordance with the Scriptures. 
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It must be noted that the context of John 14:11, thus of perichoresis, 
represents the incarnate state. This is the same point that pertains to 
Jesus’ remark that “the Father is greater than I” (John 14:28) which is 
true only for the economic Trinity, and for the incarnation. This 
statement does not refer, as Arius thought, to the immanence, the 
essential nature of God. What this perspective implies is that even in 
the incarnation, even in a state of kenosis, Jesus remained true and 
essential God, due to the complete relation to the other Persons 
through perichoresis. 
Whereas perichoresis is the means by which the Persons of the 
Trinity relate to one another and thus maintain their essential natures, 
kenosis is the means by which the Persons, especially the second 
Person, relate to creation, especially humanity, so that both humanity 
and the second Person maintain their essential natures. It is because 
of the very nature of humanity that kenosis was necessary at all. In 
order to relate to a fallen humanity, it was absolutely essential for the 
second Person to limit the expression of his divinity. Each of the 
concepts implies mutual interaction and openness, in that each of the 
elements of the relationship affects the other. This interaction is 
perhaps obvious in the Trinity, in that the nature of the first Person 
must be affected simply by relating to the others. For example, 
because of the existence of the second Person, the first Person is the 
Father. He could not be the Father unless there was also the Son. 
Likewise, the third Person, as the vinculum amoris, bond of love 
between the other two, only possesses this nature because of them. 
This relation would not be the same if even one of them did not exist. 
Because the divinity of the second Person experienced self-limitation, 
this characterictic reflected onto the other Persons as well. In 
particular, the manifestation of the Holy Spirit was restricted during the 
period of Jesus’ kenosis, but when he ascended, the Spirit manifested 
itself in greater measure. The obscure comment of John 7:39 indeed 
links the giving of the Spirit with the glorification of Jesus (Murray, 
1963:39). Congar (1983:5) suggests that the kenosis of the Spirit is in 
terms of his personality, so that he has no name. Moltmann 
(1985:102) also speaks of the kenosis of the Spirit, resulting in his 
suffering in the face of ecological destruction. Likewise the kenosis of 
the Father is seen in his transcendence. Eschatologically, however, 
this also passes away, when “the dwelling of God is with men” (Rev. 
21:3). 
This point is reflected in the parallel to perichoresis that applies in the 
case of the incarnation. The two natures in Christ are believed to 
mutually affect each other – an idea known as the communicatio 
idiomatum. On the one side of the causal effect, the divinity of Christ 
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implies that although he was fully and totally human, “consubstantial 
with us” in terms of the Chalcedonian definition, that humanity was 
sinless. This aspect is indeed reflected in Biblical material (Heb. 4:15; 
1 Pet. 2:22). Although it has been suggested that this view implies that 
Jesus could not be fully human, it also implies that sin is surely not 
part of the essence of humanity. The original understanding of kenosis 
was that while the metaphysical attributes of the second Person 
were curtailed, the moral ones, such as love and holiness, were, 
however, unaffected (McGrath, 1997:260). In this case the holiness 
of Christ’s deity affects his humanity and renders it sinless. This 
situation is possible because of the effect of the divine will upon the 
human will. Even though Christ, as fully human, had a human will, this 
was in total harmony with the divine. 
The other side of the causal effect then explains why kenosis was 
necessary in the first place. If the deity of Christ is affected by his 
human nature, which acts in a limited way, the divine, as incarnate, 
also limits himself. Thomasius pointed out that as the divinity of the 
second Person affected his humanity, as traditionally is noted, the 
limitation of humanity also affected the divinity (Erickson, 1991:80). It 
may be noted that Jesus was not only limited as human, but further 
chose humility (Philip. 2:8). The choice of kenosis parallels the choice 
of humility. This also means that divinity is open. As the nature of 
humanity is to be open to be affected by the world, so is the divine. 
Finally, this will mean that in the reversing of kenosis after the depths 
of humiliation at the cross, the humanity of Jesus is also glorified as is 
seen in the resurrection body and the appearance to the seer of 
Patmos (Rev. 1:12 ff.). 
6. Relationality 
Understanding God primarily in relational rather than substantive 
categories, strengthens the acceptance of the idea of kenosis as a 
real self-limitation of especially the second Person. Seeing it in these 
terms, as a restriction in relation, may well be more satisfactory than 
the removal of attributes, which need not be affected. A constantly 
recurring point of criticism of traditional theology, particularly pertinent 
to the Trinity, is its expression in terms of substance. It is this which 
generates so many of its difficulties. Contemporary thinking is, 
however, generally more sympathetic to see the nature of something 
in terms of relation (Pinnock, 2001:79). A human being is such as he 
or she relates to others and the environment in a human way; a 
solitary person is effectively less than human. God exists as such – 
not because he has attributes – but because he relates divinely. 
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Perichoresis is a relational term and the same is basically true of 
kenosis.  
This approach is especially pertinent to the Christian concept of God, 
for the Trinity is fundamentally relational. Indeed, there is a strand 
which sees the difference between the Persons simply as differences 
in relation. This interpretation means that these relations in the 
immanent Trinity are not essentially changed by the addition of other 
relationships, which are, however, limited. More pertinently, the 
essential relationships to the other Persons did not change when the 
second Person became incarnate, relating to humanity, even though 
they must have been affected. Thus a man does not change his basic 
relationships to other people, and thus his humanity, when he 
becomes a father, even though other relationships could be affected. 
Nevertheless, the relationship to his child undergoes considerable 
alteration over time and must always involve self-limitation. 
7. Why the concern with kenosis? 
Although it is always interesting to follow academic questions for their 
own sake, the matter of kenosis is of intense practical value. 
The idea is immediately attractive as it provides a solution to the 
contentious issue of human suffering and the wider matter of evil. 
Richard (1997:4) observes that suffering is the human experience 
most in need of elucidation. As God is indeed omnipotent and fully 
loving, it has been very hard to understand why suffering should 
occur. Particularly if the sovereignty of God is emphasised as the 
direct cause of all that occurs, it is hard to avoid retreating behind the 
inscrutability of the divine (Wright, 1996:197). It is not surprising that 
the issue of suffering has driven many from a Christian affirmation. In 
this respect part of the response, in agreement with Moltmann and 
Bonhoeffer’s views, is that God suffers with the human situation, 
sharing its pain, but this cannot really help too much. An affirmation of 
kenosis, however, has a direct bearing on the issue. 
• Even though God, as omnipotent, can stop suffering, He rather 
has chosen to limit himself in order to respect human freedom. 
Freedom, despite its cost, is of immense value and this is only 
possible if God restricts his absolute control, at least in the present.  
• Secondly, it must be appreciated that the depths of kenosis in the 
cross of Christ were just for human benefit in salvation.  
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• Thirdly, unlike other suggestions, e.g. in process theology, kenosis 
does not reflect an inherent limitation in God, but includes the 
affirmation of God’s ultimate control.  
Kenosis should be seen in the context of its eschatological reversal, 
when all suffering and pain is seen to have been worthwhile. John’s 
illustration of the attitude of the total joy of a woman who has come 
through the pain of childbirth into the joy of a new life (John 16:21) is 
very apt and applicable. It is significant that the proponents of “open 
theism” cannot really tolerate an absolutely open and thus insecure 
future – albeit inconsistently, they often affirm a measure of 
determinism. 
Kenosis, as a voluntary self-limitation, carries with it the possibility of 
God’s intervention even in the present, such as miracles and the 
answering of prayer, provided that they do not conflict with its basic 
purpose of enabling human freedom. There is no suggestion of God’s 
inability to act. It should always be borne in mind that even pain can 
have a good result. God’s apparent lack of action may thus indeed be 
for the best and actually perceived as pointing to his love. 
Finally, the idea of kenosis contributes to the understanding of the 
means of salvation. It is significant that, just as the limitation of 
humanity is due to a free choice of sin, it is this limitation which is also 
behind the kenosis of Christ. The Philippian hymn puts this idea firmly 
in the context of atonement: it was because of sin that atonement was 
necessary at all. It is also evident that kenosis deepened as the drama 
of the atonement progressed, with the most complete emptying 
occurring in the actual crucifixion. This process must always be seen 
in a Trinitarian context, that is, God desiring “new partners for the 
eternal dance” (Pinnock, 2001:30), which is how perichoresis has 
been described. 
A frequent theme in the Patristic understanding of salvation is that of 
the so-called “amazing exchange”: Jesus, as sinless and divine, 
died for sinful human people, experiencing the effect of their sin in 
his death and giving them his life. Although this perspective is 
usually presented in the obvious terms of the contrast between life 
and death, sin and holiness, the same principle is applicable in the 
wider context of the humiliation of Christ. The reason for his 
assumption of kenosis was that people, through the effect of their 
sin, were already experiencing emptiness. Certainly an aspect of 
salvation is the giving of wholeness, enabled by the voluntary 
yielding up by Christ of his own – again, there is an exchange. This 
act highlights the Christian message that Jesus did come to help 
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people to salvation. Salvation is not just the forgiveness of sins, not 
even the attainment of eternal life, but so that people could become 
whole, as fully human as God created them to be, open in their 
relationship to God and so to one another – also thus more Christ-
like. Although after the glorification of Christ, his kenosis would have 
ceased, Jesus would not have stopped being human; indeed he is 
only what humans should be. At our resurrection, we will become 
really human for the first time! 
8. Conclusion 
A major reason for the questioning of the idea of kenosis might be that 
it is so contrary to the reigning ethos, where people are constantly 
being urged to promote themselves, to acquire all that they can, even 
at the expense of other people. Humility, and especially self-limitation, 
are totally unfashionable. Yet such a practice cannot be acceptable to 
Christians. At the very least it is non-sustainable and damaging the 
world – which is one of the reasons for its rejection by Moltmann. 
Perpaps more importantly, such an attitude and way of behaviour is 
above all destructive of human relationships. 
Perhaps the early Christians were right in their practice of self-
limitation in that this practice was not just due to a dualistic rejection of 
the material, but served as a fundamental issue of their faith. Such a 
conclusion would have far-reaching consequences, but if it is a valid 
part of the imitation of Christ, it must be taken seriously. It is indeed 
necessary to consider in all seriousness what the emptying of Christ 
was all about. 
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